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ESSAYS
WHY CHURCH AND STATE SHOULD BE SEPARATE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
A couple of years ago, I argued a case at the United States
Supreme Court involving the constitutionality of the Ten Com-
mandments monument that sits between the Texas State Capitol
and the Texas Supreme Court.' The monument is six feet high and
three feet wide,2 and atop it in large letters and words it states, "I
am the Lord, thy God."3
In the days before the argument at the Supreme Court, the case
received a great deal of media attention.4 Some of the reports
mentioned that I was the attorney who would be arguing the case
against the monument before the Court,5 and as a result, I received
a large amount of what can only be described as hate mail.6 Some of
it, in its viciousness, was shocking.
By itself, what this showed me was that there are some people
who care very deeply about having religious symbols on government
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. This Essay was
originally delivered as a lecture at the College of William & Mary in March 2007.
1. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 736 app. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the actual monument reads: "I AM the
LORD, thy God." Id. at 707.
4. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Ten Commandments Reach the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A12; Sylvia Moreno, Supreme Court on a Shoestring: Homeless Man
Takes on Texas Religious Display, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2005, at Al.
5. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 4; Moreno, supra note 4.
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property. But there were also more subtle lessons to be learned. The
State of Texas was arguing in front of the U.S. Supreme Court that
it wanted the Ten Commandments monument to remain because of
the historical importance of the Ten Commandments as a source of
law.' I was easily and quickly convinced, however, that this was not
at all the reason why the people who were sending me hate mail
wanted the monument there. They wanted the Ten Commandments
there because it was a religious message and a religious symbol.
After all, it was not that long ago that the Chief Justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, was removed from office
because of a two and a half ton Ten Commandments display in the
Alabama State Courthouse.' He defied a court order to keep the Ten
Commandments there,9 obviously not because he thought it was an
important historical symbol. Rather, he wanted it there because it
was a religious symbol, and it had come to be taken as a symbol of
his religion.'°
As a result of my experience in the Ten Commandments case, I
was saddened but not surprised when I heard of the controversy
surrounding President Gene Nichol's decision to remove the cross
from the Wren Chapel at the College of William & Mary." The
people who had wanted to keep the Ten Commandments at the
Texas State Capitol were, at least philosophically, the very same
people who would want to keep the cross atop the altar in the chapel
at William & Mary. Their goal was not to keep the cross because of
some historical message, but rather because they believed that as
a religious symbol, it should be on display. 2
7. See Brief for Respondent at **32-36, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500), 2005 WL
263793.
8. Jeffrey Gettleman, Monument Is Now Out of Sight, but Not Out of Mind, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2003, at A14; see also Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So. 2d 848, 862 (Ala.
2004).
9. Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1068 (M.D. Ala. 2003); see also Shaila K
Dewan, The Big Name in Alabama's Primary Isn't on the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004,
at N16.
10. See Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
11. Fred Kunkle, School's Move Toward Inclusion Creates a Rift, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2006, at B1. President Nichol indicated that he "wanted to make the chapel welcoming to
students of all faiths," and removed the cross in October 2006. Id.
12. See id.
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What underlies the debate, whether it is over the Ten Com-
mandments at the Texas State Capitol grounds or the cross in the
chapel at William & Mary, is the profound question of whether to
have a secular government or whether to have a government that
affiliates with and advances religion. The underlying issue is that
stark. The reason that I agreed to handle the Ten Commandments
case is that I believe deeply that our government should be secular.
It should not be affiliated with any religion and it should not
advance any religion. But I also know that those who are on the
other side believe just as deeply that they want their government to
be religious, not secular.
This Essay will discuss the role of religion in a public university.
In order to do that effectively, I will begin by discussing more
generally the appropriate role of religion in the government, and
then, based upon those principles, I will address the role of religion
in public universities.
This Essay is divided into three Parts. In Part I, I will discuss the
competing visions of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
Part II then suggests what I believe is the preferable vision: one
that tries, to the greatest extent possible, to separate church and
state. In this context, I will move to a discussion in Part III of the
appropriate role of religion in a public university.
I. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The controversy over the cross in the chapel at William & Mary
is obviously part of a larger constitutional and cultural debate. The
provision of the Constitution at stake is found in the First Amend-
ment. It says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion .....13 In 1947, the United States Supreme Court
held that although the provision refers to Congress, it applies
equally to state and local governments. 4 There is an ongoing debate
among the Justices and among constitutional scholars regarding
the best understanding of the Establishment Clause. What I find
interesting is that each of the Justices-and each of the scholars
---can invoke quotes from Framers of the Constitution to support a
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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particular conception of the clause. I think that Justice Robert
Jackson got it right, albeit in another context, when he said, "Just
what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had
they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh."'5 Research will reveal little more than
competing quotations that each side cites to support its position.
There are three major competing views of the Establishment
Clause. One view is strict separation." This says that, to the
greatest extent possible, we should separate church and state. The
idea is that our government should be secular. 7 The place for
religion is in the private realm-in our homes; in our churches,
synagogues, or mosques; in our own consciences; and in our own
daily behavior. Those who believe that this is the right interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause think that Thomas Jefferson got
it right when he coined the phrase that there should be "a wall of
separation between church and state"l'-a wall that the Supreme
Court later declared both "high and impregnable."' 9 It is interesting
that when the Supreme Court in 1947 held that the Establishment
Clause applied to state and local governments, all nine Justices
then on the Court endorsed this notion that there should be a wall
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the intended scope of the executive power).
16. See Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 35-36
(2005) (describing the strict separationist view).
17. Professor Lupu argues that strict separation was the dominant theory for the
Establishment Clause from 1947 to 1980. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism,
62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 233 (1994); see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)
(limiting aid to parochial schools); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226
(1963) (banning prayer in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (banning
prayer in public schools).
18. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Jefferson's letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association). This was the first reference in the Supreme Court to
"Jefferson's now ubiquitous ... statement." Mark J. Chadsey, Thomas Jefferson and the
Establishment Clause, 40 AKRON L. REV. 623, 638 n.67 (2007). For the original text of the
letter, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messers. Nehemiah Dodge et al., a Comm. of the
Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/locglcib/9806/danpost.
html.
19. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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separating church and state.2" Today, it is highly questionable
whether a majority of the Court would endorse this view.
There is a second vision of the Establishment Clause, much
different from the first. This view argues that the Establishment
Clause commands that government should be neutral with regard
to religion.2 ' The government should not favor religion over secular
matters, or for that matter, secularism over religion. 22 The govern-
ment should never favor one religion over others; it should simply
be neutral.
Over the last quarter century, those who take this second
approach have often thought of it as a requirement that the govern-
ment should not symbolically endorse religion, or a particular
religion. Sandra Day O'Connor was the first Justice to put the test
in this way.23 She did so over a quarter century ago, coining the
symbolic "endorsement" test.24 Under this test, the question is
whether the government is, from the perspective of a reasonable
observer, symbolically endorsing religion or a particular religion.25
Those who take this approach say that religion is an enormously
important part of American history and of American society today.
Religion should not be excluded, but neither should it be favored.
Given the diversity of religious beliefs, it is essential that the
government always be neutral among them.26
A third competing vision, quite different from the first two, is
called the accommodationist perspective. This view says that we
should accommodate religion and government, and accommodate
20. Id. at 15; id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
600-01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing the agreement between the majority and
dissent in Everson with Jefferson's conception of strict separation).
21. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 96 (1961); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990).
22. See Rubin, supra note 16; see also Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1989)
(invalidating tax exemption for religious periodicals); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-
04 (1968) (invalidating law prohibiting teaching of evolution).
23. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. ('CThe proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 771, 816-
18 (2001).
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government support for religion.27 This approach says that the
government violates the Establishment Clause only if it literally
establishes a church or coerces religious participation. 2' Nothing
else violates the Establishment Clause besides this.
Those who take this approach quote a Supreme Court decision
from a few decades ago that states, "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. ' 29 Those who take this
approach are fond of pointing to George Washington's Thanksgiving
Proclamation,3 ° or even to Thomas Jefferson talking about the rights
that come from our Creator.31 They believe that, to a large extent,
it is permissible for religion to be a part of government, so long as
the government does not go so far as to literally establish a church
or coerce religious participation.
Now, I have presented these three views to you in quite an
abstract manner. But almost any issue of the Establishment Clause
that you can think of, including the controversy over the cross in the
William & Mary chapel, comes down to these three approaches. Let
me give some examples to make this concrete rather than abstract.
Nineteen years ago, in 1989, the Supreme Court decided County
of Allegheny v. ACLU. 2 This was decided as two companion
cases that came to the Supreme Court together.33 One involved a
county courthouse that showcased a nativity scene in its large
stairway display case during the December holiday season.34 The
other involved a Pittsburgh city building.35 In front of the building,
a menorah was placed during the holiday season, as well as a
Christmas tree and a proclamation about the importance of
tolerance during the holiday season.36 The Supreme Court held that
27. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 14.
28. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
29. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
30. GEORGE WASHINGTON, THANKSGIVING PROCLAMATION (1789), reprinted in 4 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, SEPTEMBER 1789-JANUARY 1790, at
131-32 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
32. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id. at 579.
35. Id. at 578.
36. Id. at 581-82.
2198 [Vol. 49:2193
WHY CHURCH AND STATE SHOULD BE SEPARATE
the nativity scene was unconstitutional, but the menorah was
constitutional.37
Stated that way, it may seem strange: surely the Supreme Court
was not favoring Jewish religious symbols over Christian ones. But
the way in which the Court came to this result was the product of a
division among the Justices with respect to the three theories of the
Establishment Clause. Four Justices took the accommodationist
perspective.38 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for them; he was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice
Scalia.39 Justice Kennedy expressly espoused the accommodationist
philosophy: the government only violates the Establishment Clause
if it is creating a church or coercing religious participation.4 °
Religious symbols on government property do not do that.41 For
these Justices, both the nativity scene and the menorah, or any
religious symbol, would be permissible.42
Three of the Justices would have found both the nativity scene
and the menorah unconstitutional.43 These would be the strict
separationist Justices. At that time, the three were Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.44 Their view was that, although a
private business and even a private university can put up religious
symbols, such symbols do not belong on government property.45
Certainly, a nativity scene is quintessentially a religious symbol.46
In fact, it is a profoundly important religious symbol for those of
the Christian faith.4" A menorah is also a religious symbol; it is a
symbol of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah.48 It is about a particular
event in Jewish history, when Jews were endangered and had
only enough oil for one night, but it burned for eight days. 49 This is
37. Id. at 621.
38. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 662-63.
41. Id. at 664.
42. See id. at 679.
43. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 637-38.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 582-83 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 583.
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forever memorialized in the menorah, as it is lit night by night for
the eight nights of Hanukkah. ° Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens said that both the nativity scene and the menorah are
religious symbols and should not be on government property.5 1
This left Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. They were the
neutrality Justices. Their view was that the government violates
the Establishment Clause only if the government is symbolically
endorsing religion, or a particular religion.5 2 For them, the nativity
scene in the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause
because it was a religious symbol of one religion on government
property. 53 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor earlier had said that
there could be nativity scenes on government property as long as
they were accompanied by symbols of other religions and secular
symbols.54 For them, a nativity scene standing alone on government
property was an impermissible symbolic endorsement of Christian-
ity.5
5
By contrast, they found that the menorah was permissible be-
cause it was surrounded by other symbols.56 There was a Christmas
tree.57 There was a proclamation about tolerance in the holiday
season.58 There was an overall holiday display. According to
Blackmun and O'Connor, the reasonable observer would not see the
menorah as part of a religious display, but as part of a holiday
display.59 Consequently, there was no symbolic endorsement for
Judaism.6 ° Thus, the Court very much divided along the lines of
these three Establishment Clause theories.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 601 (majority opinion); id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although Blackmun
and O'Connor agreed, Blackmun delivered the majority opinion.
53. Id. at 612 (majority opinion); id. at 626-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In Lynch, I concluded that the city's display of
a creche in its larger holiday exhibit in a private park in the commercial district had neither
the purpose nor the effect of conveying a message of government endorsement of Christianity
or disapproval of other religions." (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring))).
55. Id. at 612-13 (majority opinion); id. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 617 (majority opinion); id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 617 (majority opinion); id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 617-18 (majority opinion); id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 619 (majority opinion); id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Two years ago, I argued in the Supreme Court about the Texas
Ten Commandments monument.61 As I approached that case, I
counted the Justices exactly along the lines of these three theories.
Going in, I felt that three of the Justices were strict separationists:
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. In many opinions over the
years, they had espoused the strict separationist philosophy.62 I also
knew that there were four accommodationist Justices: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas.63
Just as I was fairly confident that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Souter would vote on my behalf, I knew that, realistically, there was
no chance I would get the votes of Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, or
Thomas. That left the two Justices then on the Court who took the
neutrality approach: Justices O'Connor and Breyer.' My brief and
presentation of oral argument to the Supreme Court was all about
why this six-foot high and three-foot wide Ten Commandments
monument should be seen as a symbolic endorsement of religion.65
I was pretty confident that I would get Justice Breyer's vote; in most
religion cases, he had gone along with Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg.66 I thought the case would turn on Justice O'Connor.
61. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); see supra notes 1-3.
62. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867-68 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Stevens and Ginsburg joining in his dissent); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 242 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (Stevens and Ginsburg joining in his dissent).
63. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-64
(1995). Although the Capitol Square majority included Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer,
the portion of the opinion expressing the accommodationist perspective, written by Justice
Scalia, was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at
756.
64. For a contrast of the neutrality approach with the accommodationist approach, see id.
at 772-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Breyer joining in her concurrence).
65. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at **3, 16-17, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500),
2005 WL 429975; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 9-10.
66. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joining Justice Souter in upholding a preliminary injunction barring the display
of the Ten Commandments); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,686 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joining Justice Souter in arguing that
tuition assistance for children attending religiously affiliated schools violates the
Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joining Justice Stevens in finding that student-led prayer at
public schools violates the Establishment Clause); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,863 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joining Justice Souter in arguing that UVA was compelled by the Establishment
Clause to deny a religious group publication funding).
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Therefore, I was not surprised when, in June of 2005, I learned
that I lost 5-4.67 1 was surprised, though, when I found out that I got
Justice O'Connor's vote, but lost because of Justice Breyer.6" Of
course, he did not go along with Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion.' 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, as I expected, wrote an opinion
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.7 ° He wrote that
religious symbols on government property do not violate the
Establishment Clause.71 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment
to allow the Ten Commandments monument to stay, but not for the
reasons in the plurality opinion.72 In fact, Breyer agreed with the
dissenting Justices, including Justice O'Connor, that the proper
test is whether there was symbolic endorsement of religion.7" But,
he found that this particular Ten Commandments monument was
not a symbolic endorsement of religion.74 It had been in place since
1961; 7" it had been paid for by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, not the
State of Texas; and there were many other monuments on the
Texas State Capitol grounds."v
So, until the summer of 2005, when Chief Justice Rehnquist died
and Justice O'Connor retired, there were three Justices who were
strict separationists, two who took the neutrality approach, and four
who took the accommodationist approach.7"
All of this also explains the controversy regarding the cross in the
chapel at William & Mary. If one is a strict separationist, one would
67. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677, 679, 692.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 690 ("Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with
a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.").
72. Id. at 699-705 (Breyer, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 699-700.
74. Id. at 703 ("I believe that the Texas display-serving a mixed but primarily
nonreligious purpose, not primarily 'advanc[ing]' or 'inhibit[ing] religion,' and not creating an
'excessive government entanglement with religion,'-might satisfy this Court's more formal
Establishment Clause tests." (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971))).
75. Id. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 702. In fact, the monument was located in "a large park containing 17
monuments and 21 historical markers, all designed to illustrate the 'ideals' of those who
settled in Texas." Id.
78. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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argue that the cross is an inherently religious symbol. A few years
ago, the Ninth Circuit, in a case that involved a cross on public
property on a hill outside of San Diego, held that the cross is the
preeminent symbol of Christianity;79 especially for Catholics, it is a
symbol of profound religious importance. Thus, if you are a strict
separationist, you would say that the place for a cross is in a
student's dorm room, a faculty office, a person's home, and maybe
a person's lawn, a church, or a private business, but not in a public
university.80
If one takes the neutrality approach, the question is: what would
a reasonable observer think upon seeing the cross in the chapel at
William & Mary?"' Would the reasonable observer think that it was
there for religious purposes, or just for historical purposes? One
could argue over that point; my own sense is that a cross in a chapel
is a religious message, not a historical message, but I understand
that one could disagree.
Of course, the accommodationist approach would say that reli-
gious symbols on government property are fine.82 Even a religious
symbol as profoundly sectarian as a cross is allowed because it is not
actually establishing a church or coercing religious participation.
Now, with regard to the Supreme Court, a different Court exists
today than the one before which I argued Van Orden v. Perry83 two
years ago. Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced by Chief Justice
John Roberts; 4 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was replaced by
Justice Samuel Alito. 5 This new Court has not dealt with an
Establishment Clause issue, but most commentators, liberal and
conservative, think that this is the area most likely to see a major
79. Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that crosses on
public property violated California's Constitution since they represented the "preeminent
symbol of Christianity").
80. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. In fact, one of the plaintiffs in Ellis was
John Murphy, a Catholic who was offended by the display of the cross on public property. See
Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1523.
81. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
83. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
84. Maura Reynolds, Roberts Is Sworn In as Chief Justice: Much of Washington's Attention
Has Already Turned to the Other Court Vacancy, Which Could Be Much More Contentious,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
85. Jeff Zeleny, Alito Now 2nd Bush Justice: Roberts Swears Him In After Partisan 58-42
Senate Vote, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2006, at Cl.
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shift in constitutional doctrine.8" Most likely, John Roberts believes
in the same approach that William Rehnquist did-the accom-
modationist approach; most agree that Samuel Alito endorses that
view as well."7 Today, there may very well be five Justices who
believe in that accommodationist approach, and if so, we could soon
see radical changes in the law regarding the Establishment Clause.
II. THE CASE FOR STRICT SEPARATION
In this Part, I would like to discuss why the strict separationist
approach is the preferable one with regard to the Establishment
Clause. There are many reasons for this: I could make an originalist
argument, saying that Thomas Jefferson really meant it when he
spoke of a wall of separation between church and state, and that his
words reflect the original meaning of the drafters.88 I could argue
that I believe that the Framers saw themselves as children of the
Enlightenment, where reason would replace religion as a basis for
decision.89 I could also argue that many came to the United States
to avoid religious persecution, and that the Framers wanted to avoid
what was in England-an official state church.9 ° But I must admit,
86. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Some Animals Are More Equal than Others: The Rehnquist
Court and "Majority Religion': 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 323, 341 (2006) ("[A]nd ... the Roberts
Court will begin from the forward position secured by the Rehnquist Court and move the
church-state line even more radically in the pro-religion direction."); Jay A. Sekulow &
Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding the
Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 60 (2005) ('rhe replacement
of Rehnquist by John Roberts ... portends a realignment on these cases that will probably lead
the Court at least in the direction of the Van Orden plurality...." (citations omitted)).
87. See, e.g., Sekulow & Manion, supra note 86, at 50 & nn.118-19 (speculating that the
addition of Roberts and Alto will move the Court toward Chief Justice Rehnquist's Van Orden
plurality).
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
89. See generally DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 39-45, 49-51
(2006) (explaining that Deists were a product of the Enlightenment who believed in "human
inquiry as well as a self-confident challenge of traditional political, religious, and social ideas,"
and that chief among them were "Franklin, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison and
Monroe").
90. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
17-19, 40-45 (2003) ("Wlhatever their theological differences, the Protestant immigrants held
one shared conviction: religious freedom was essential for a people desiring to define and
practice the one true faith. From their past, the various English transplants brought with
them a keen appreciation of the tension running between church and state."). See generally
Edwin S. Gaustad, Geography and Demography of American Religion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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in all honesty, that I believe one could find just as much evidence
and just as many quotations from the Framers for each of the other
two theories. This is why I believe that we cannot resolve modern
constitutional issues by looking back at history; history is far too
equivocal for that. The Framers were not of one mind with regard
to religion."1 Indeed, the Framers varied greatly among themselves
in the degree of their own religious observance.92
Aside from that, I do not think one can take the world as it
existed in 1791, when the First Amendment was first adopted, and
apply it to the issues of 2008. We are a far more religiously diverse
society than the Framers could have ever imagined. The country,
at its founding, was an entirely Christian nation.9" Today, there
are more religions than I could possibly list.94 Thus, I do not make
the argument for strict separation based on the Framers' intent,
although I think I could; instead, I make it in terms of what I think
are the underlying goals of the Establishment Clause, thus asking:
THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 71, 72-73 (Charles H. Lippy & Peter W. Williams eds.,
1988) (discussing how persecution in Europe provided an impetus for religious groups to seek
freedom in the New World).
91. See HOLMES, supra note 89, at 39-45, 49-51, 143-49, 154-60 (comparing the differing
religious beliefs and motivations of several of the Framers); LAMBERT, supra note 90, at 241-
53 (describing the impact that varying religious views had on shaping the Constitution);
MICHAEL NOvAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 52-73 (2002) (discussing religious viewpoints and their influences upon the
Framers).
92. See HOLMES, supra note 89, at 39-45, 49-51, 143-49, 154-60 (comparing the differing
religious beliefs and motivations of several of the Framers); TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR
FOUNDING FATHERS 125-43 (1987) (describing the religious beliefs of five of the most
influential founding fathers); MICHAELNOVAK & JANANOVAK, WASHINGTON'S GOD: RELIGION,
LIBERTY, AND THE FATHERS OF OUR COUNTRY 119-42 (2006) (describing the religious
convictions of George Washington).
93. SYDNEY E. AHISTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 124 & n. 1 (2d
ed. 2004) ("Indeed, Puritanism provided the moral and religious background of fully 75
percent of the people who declared their independence in 1776." (citation omitted)); see
LAHAYE, supra note 92, at 68-70 (noting that the "four million citizens who shared in the
founding of this republic were not only Christian, but also overwhelmingly Protestant").
94. See, e.g., Newell S. Booth, Jr., Islam in North America, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 723 (Charles H. Lippy & Peter W. Williams eds., 1988);
Robert S. Ellwood, Occult Movements in America, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, supra, at 711; John Y. Fenton, Hinduism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, supra, at 683; C. Carlyle Haaland, Shinto and Indigenous
Chinese Religion, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, supra, at 699;
Charles S. Prebish, Buddhism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE,
supra, at 669.
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what are the objectives that the constitutional provision was meant
to achieve?
Strict separation is desirable for several reasons. First, I think
that it is a way of ensuring that we can all feel that it is "our"
government, whatever our religion or lack of religion. If government
becomes aligned with a particular religion or religions, those of
other beliefs are made to feel like outsiders. Justice O'Connor
captured this better than anyone in her writings for the Court. She
said that the Establishment Clause is there to make sure that none
of us is led to feel that we are insiders or outsiders when it comes to
our government. 95 I do not know if any of you have had the experi-
ence of going to a banquet where a minister or priest of a different
religion stands up and gives a very sectarian benediction or
invocation. It makes one feel very out of place, as though one does
not belong there. The same thing happens if our government
becomes aligned with a particular religion. Some of us are made to
feel that we just do not belong in that place. If there were a large
Latin cross atop a city hall, those who were not part of religions that
accept the cross as a religious symbol would feel that it was not
"their" city government.
When I argued in front of the Supreme Court in the Ten Com-
mandments case, I said, "Imagine that [a] judge put the Ten
Commandments right above his or her bench. That would make
some individuals feel like outsiders."96 In the same way, how would
one who does not accept God, or one who does not believe that there
is one God, feel about walking into the Texas Supreme Court or the
Texas State Capitol and seeing "I am the Lord, thy God," and seeing
underneath it, 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me"?97 It seems
to me that if we want our citizens to feel that the government is
open for everyone-that it is their government-we need our
government to be strictly secular.
A second important reason to favor strict separationism is that
it is wrong to tax people to support the religion of others. James
95. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, and not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders....").
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 17-18.
97. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 679, 707 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Madison captured this best in Virginia, where he talked about why
he believed that it was, in his words, "immoral" to tax people to
support religions in which they did not believe.98 Each of us has our
own religion, or maybe we decided that we do not have any religion,
but should our tax dollars go to advance a religion in which we do
not believe? What if it is a religion that teaches things that we find
abhorrent? Should we have our tax dollars go to that? Certainly we
have the right to give our money to support any religion or any
cause we want, but it is wrong to be coerced to give our tax dollars
to religions we do not believe in. That is why strict separation is
best: it allows people to choose how to spend their money, rather
than permitting the government to use it against their own wishes.
A third reason that strict separation is best is that it prevents the
coercion that is inherent when the government becomes aligned
with religion. World history, to say nothing of the history of this
country, shows us that inherently, when the government becomes
aligned with religion, people feel coerced to participate.99 Sometimes
it can be in the context of public schools. A few years ago, a contro-
versy arose regarding the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance. 0 My daughter was then attending a Los Angeles public
school. When she came home at the beginning of her second week of
kindergarten, she wanted to demonstrate to her mom and me that
she could say the Pledge of Allegiance. She put her hand over her
heart, and she recited it, including the words "under God." My
wife turned to me and said, "I thought that the Ninth Circuit said
that students weren't supposed to say 'under God." 1 My daughter,
having no idea what the Ninth Circuit was, said, "Oh, you have to
say that or else you get sent to the principal's office." That is
certainly not what the teacher told the kids, but what my daughter
98. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment (June
20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298-306 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1973) (urging the Commonwealth of Virginia not to enact a bill providing support to religious
groups through the levy of a tax).
99. See, e.g., HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: AN HISTORIcAL REVISION 10-11
(1997) (discussing the status of conversos--Jews or Muslims who had been forced to convert
to Christianity-and the continuing pressure to conform in fourteenth century Spain).
100. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004);
see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court To Consider Case on "Under God" in Pledge to
Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at Al.
101. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612.
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internalized during her first week of kindergarten is that you do
what the teacher says or the punishment is that you go to the
principal's office. What the teacher told her was that you say the
words "under God." She was five years old at the time, but notice
the coercion. It was very subtle coercion, but it was there. Certainly,
this is why the Supreme Court has repeated for forty-five years that
prayer, even voluntary prayer, does not belong in public schools.1"2
Once the government becomes aligned with religion, coercion
becomes so easy. We have seen this at public universities. Cadets at
the Air Force Academy talk movingly about being forced to partici-
pate in Christian religious ceremonies, even if they are not Chris-
tians.1 3 This is the danger if we do not separate church and state.
A fourth reason why strict separation is the best theory is to
protect religion. Roger Williams, a co-founder of Rhode Island,
talked about this prior to the drafting of the Establishment
Clause.'0 4 He wanted to separate church and state not to safeguard
the state from religion, but to protect religion from the state.'0 5 The
reality is that the more the government becomes involved in
religion, the more the government will regulate religion and,
consequently, the greater the danger is to religion. There is also the
danger of trivializing religion.0 6 I have often thought, for religious
people, the problem with saying the nativity scene is secular-and
that is why it should remain on government property-is that it
trivializes a profound religious symbol. To say that a cross is just
there for secular purposes ignores how important the cross is as a
religious symbol.
102. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that the Establishment Clause
forbids prayer at public school graduations); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking
down a statute authorizing "moments of silence" at public schools as violating the
Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (finding
that the Establishment Clause barred reading Bible passages in public schools); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that states may not compose official prayer to be read in
public schools).
103. Josh White, Intolerance Found at Air Force Academy, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at
A2.
104. See JAMES P. BYRD, JR., THE CHALLENGES OF ROGER WILLIAMS 121.27 (2002) ("In the
process of corrupting the church, Williams believed that Christendom had corrupted biblical
exegesis by devising an interpretative method that supported the state's claim to authority
over religious matters.").
105. Id.
106. See Madison, supra note 98, at 301.
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I do not believe that strict separation is hostile to religion. I
strongly believe that we need a robust Free Exercise Clause to
guard the ability of people to practice whatever religion they choose,
or to practice no religion. But the place for religion should be in the
private realm; our government should be strictly secular.
The problem that I have with the neutrality theory, in terms of
symbolic endorsement, is as follows: how do you decide whether a
reasonable person would see a symbol as religious or secular? How
do you determine if a person who walked into the Wren Chapel
would see the cross as being there for religious or historical reasons?
I was amused in the Ten Commandments case 10 7 that the State
of Texas argued that the Ten Commandments were there for
historical purposes. They argued, "Look at all the other symbols on
the ground."'18 They included in their brief an aerial photo of the
Texas State Capitol grounds to show all of the symbols. 109 Certainly,
we cannot decide what a reasonable observer would think based on
the perspective of a reasonable observer in a low-flying airplane."0
Yet Justice Breyer included that aerial photograph of the Texas
State Capitol grounds in his opinion."'
The problem with the accommodationist theory is that it really
imposes no limits on the ability of the government to support
religion, or of religion to become a part of government. If one were
to take this approach-and there well may be five Justices on the
bench today who would do so" 2-then the government could put a
large Latin cross atop a city hall; the government could have
voluntary prayer in schools; and the government could give aid to
parochial schools, so long as it did not discriminate amongst
religions-even if the aid was used for religious indoctrination. To
me, that belies the key goals of the Establishment Clause.
107. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
108. Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at *4 (paraphrasing respondent's brief).
109. Id. at add. A.
110. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 65, at *3.
111. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 706 app. (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. See supra notes 63, 86-87 and accompanying text.
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III. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
In conclusion, it is important to talk about the role of religion in
a public university. I think a university is a very special place. At
the risk of mixing metaphors and invoking religion in an Essay in
which I am endorsing secularism, I would even say that a university
is a sacred place. Many things make a university special, including
the commitment to academic freedom-that all ideas should be
expressed and debated; and the commitment to diversity in every
way-diversity in terms of who is on the faculty, who are the
students, and what views are held. The university is truly a place
where people of all persuasions and types and views should be
present. The public university is also a place where people, at times,
must be present. Students live in dormitories. Students have to go
to class (at least they are supposed to). Faculty have offices. The
university is not a place where people can just drop in and out on a
whim. We have to be sensitive, therefore, to what is endorsed and
espoused by the objects allowed to be present there.
Religion in the public university should be guided by three
principles. First, the university must protect the free exercise of
religion. I have been focusing on the Establishment Clause, and the
reason I do so is because that is the underlying issue about the cross
in the William & Mary Wren Chapel; but we should not ignore the
free exercise of religion. Universities should carefully protect the
free exercise of religion.113 Universities should ensure that students
are excused for religious holidays. That does not mean universities
should cancel classes on Good Friday or Rosh Hashanah, but they
should excuse students who believe their religion requires them not
to attend class. Chapels, too, have an important place at the public
university. Often students do not have the ability to go off campus
for religious observance, so a chapel provides a convenient place for
students to go for their own religious observances and celebrations.
113. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-72 nn.10-12 (1981) (indicating that public
universities should not restrict the equal access of religious groups to public fora on campus
and noting that were the university to exclude religious groups, such activity would "risk
greater 'entanglement"' with religion (citing Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1318 (8th Cir.
1980))).
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The second principle that has to be followed at a public university
is that there has to be strong protection of religious speech by
students. This is distinguished from free exercise generally because
speech of all sorts, including religious speech, deserves unique
protection in the university.114 There was a Supreme Court case over
a quarter-century ago in which the University of Missouri at Kansas
City said that any student group could use campus buildings, unless
it was a religious group that wanted to use the building. 5 The
Supreme Court got it right in ruling against the University of
Missouri."' The government should not be able to discriminate
against speech based on content, including religious content."7 If a
university is going to open its buildings and facilities to secular
student groups, it should open those buildings equally to religious
student groups."' There should be no discrimination based on the
content of the speech.
The third and final principle is that a public university should be
strictly secular in all the university does. This fits very much with
the strict separationist philosophy, and is also not inconsistent with
the neutrality principle." 9 The university should protect the speech
of all students, including religious students. The university should
protect the right of every student to observe religion in every way he
or she wants. But the university itself, in everything it does, should
be strictly secular. And so for this reason, religious symbols-that
is, symbols of a particular religion-should not be displayed on
university property.
I therefore agree with President Nichol's determination that a
large Latin cross hanging in a chapel of a public university violates
the Establishment Clause, or at least the values underlying the
Establishment Clause. 2 ' It is about the religion becoming a part of
114. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) ('This Court has recognized that
[the First Amendment] right is 'nowhere more vital' than in our schools and universities."
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
115. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
116. Id. at 267.
117. Id. at 269 n.6 (noting that religious speech is no different for First Amendment
purposes than any other kind of speech).
118. Id. at 270-75 (finding that the University must open its facilities to religious and
secular groups equally).
119. See generally supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
120. See Andrew Petkofsky, W&M President Reiterates Reasons for Cross Removal,
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the government. It is about violating the wall that separates church
and state.
A cross is a profoundly sectarian religious symbol, associated with
Christian religions. Although, as explained above, universities
should have chapels to facilitate free exercise of religion, they must
be non-denominational so that all students feel welcome and treated
equally. There is an enormous difference between a public univer-
sity having a chapel and it having a Christian chapel (or one that
would be perceived that way based on its symbols).
Professor Gerard Bradley argues that removing the cross makes
the supporters of the cross feel like outsiders.12' But there is no
stopping point to his argument. By his analysis, it would be
desirable to have crosses atop every government building because
their absence makes their supporters feel like outsiders. Professor
Bradley falsely equates the interests of those who want religious
symbols with those who do not. The Establishment Clause, though,
does not make them the same. As explained above, I believe that the
Establishment Clause requires that the government be secular.
Those who want their government to support religion are denied
this preference, whereas those who want their government to be
secular prevail because that is what the Establishment Clause is all
about.
Professor Bradley also challenges the idea that a university
should make all feel welcome on campus.'22 He says, for example,
that students who object to a "Sex Workers' Art Show," for example,
do not have their sensibilities protected.123 But there is no clause in
RICHMOND TiMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 2006, at B1. When he was summoned before the Board
of Visitors, Nichol explained, 'rhough we haven't meant to do so, the display of a Christian
cross-the most potent symbol of my own religion-in the heart of our most important
building-sends an unmistakable message that the chapel belongs more fully to some of us
than to others." Id.
121. See Gerard V. Bradley, Religion at a Public University, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935,
2231-34 (2008).
122. See id. at 2221-23 (arguing that a college's actions will inevitably make some feel like
"outsiders").
123. Id. at 2222. During the Wren Cross debate, William & Mary allowed a traveling "Sex
Workers' Art Show" to perform on campus. See College of William and Mary Hosts Sex
Workers Show on Campus, FOXNEws, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,
254142,00.html. Many believed that President Nichol's refusal to prohibit the show was one
factor that contributed to his eventual resignation. See Bill Geroux, Embattled W&M Chief
Resigns; Board Tells Him It Won't Renew His Contract; He'l Still Teach at Law School,
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the Constitution that says that people are protected from all that
the government may do that makes them feel like outsiders. Unlike
Professor Bradley, I strongly agree with the many pronouncements
from the Supreme Court that separation is a core aspect of what the
Establishment Clause is about. Historical experience teaches that
making people feel like outsiders because of their religion is so
pernicious and undesirable that the government should be prohib-
ited from doing so.
Finally, Professor Bradley argues that preventing the govern-
ment's endorsement of religion in essence gives a "heckler's veto"
to those who do not want religious symbols. 124 Although "heckler's
veto" has a pejorative connotation, that is exactly what the Estab-
lishment Clause does. Lawsuits that successfully prevent prayer in
public schools also could be called a heckler's veto. For that matter,
any lawsuit that stops the government from doing something that
the majority wants can be labeled a "heckler's veto." But a Constitu-
tion that limits what government does allows law suits to enforce its
restrictions.
Of course, what really underlies my disagreement with Professor
Bradley (and his with President Nichol) is a very different view of
the Establishment Clause. Professor Bradley, for example, says
that he believes that it is the university's role to endorse religion. 125
I vehemently disagree and believe that such government endorse-
ment or support for religion violates the wall that separates church
and state. My view, as explained above, is that government should
be as secular as possible, leaving religion entirely for the private
realm of people's lives. A university, of course, must not discourage
or interfere with religion, but nor can it endorse or encourage
religious activity.
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2008, at Al.
124. Bradley, supra note 121, at 2240 (arguing that the Establishment Clause test
employed by President Nichol to justify removal of the Wren Cross was "tantament to a
heckler's veto").
125. See id. at 2241 ("[A] public university is obliged by virtue of its supervision of a
community's life to "endorse' religion ...."); see also id. at 2249-51.
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CONCLUSION
In a Ten Commandments case several years ago, Sandra Day
O'Connor said:
Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion
Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to
carry out the Founders' plan of preserving religious liberty to the
fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. By enforcing the
Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual
conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when
we see around the world the violent consequences of the
assumption of religious authority by government, Americans
may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional
boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while
allowing private religious exercise to flourish.... Those who
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state
must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade
a system that has served us so well for one that has served
others so poorly?126
President Nichol acted courageously and appropriately to enforce
the United States Constitution and maintain the wall of separation
between church and state.'27 Those who opposed and attacked him
want a form of government endorsement of sectarianism that is
fundamentally at odds with the Establishment Clause. Not only is
126. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. On February 12, 2008, President Nichol resigned from his post after learning that the
College's Board of Visitors would not renew his contract. See Geroux, supra note 123. The
morning of his resignation, Nichol sent an e-mail to the campus community in which he
offered his explanation for the Board's actions. Nichol acknowledged that he "altered the way
a Christian cross was displayed in a public facility, on a public university campus, in a chapel
used regularly for secular College events ... in order to help Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and other
religious minorities feel more meaningfully included as members of our broad community."
E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, President, College of William & Mary, to Members of the William
& Mary Community (Feb. 12, 2008, 09:42:36 EST) (on file with William and Mary Law
Review). Nichol added that the "decision was likely required by any effective notion of
separation of church and state." Id. In his message, Nichol charged that the Privileges and
Elections Committee of the Virginia House of Delegates had threatened to remove Board
appointees if Nichol was "not fired over decisions concerning the Wren Cross." Id. Defending
his decision, Nichol invoked Jefferson's "wall of separation" and stated, "We are charged, as
state actors, to respect and accommodate all religions, and to endorse none." Id.
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such a form of government dangerous, but it is also antithetical to
the First Amendment.
